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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1451 
 ___________ 
 
 SARA BALDWIN, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF CAMDEN 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-06583) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Joseph E. Irenas 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 19, 2011 
 
 Before:  JORDAN, GARTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed August 24, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Sara Baldwin, proceeding pro se, appeals from the order of the District Court 
entering final judgment in favor of the defendant.  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm.
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       I. 
In December 2009, Sara Baldwin filed a pro se complaint in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey against the Housing Authority of the City of 
Camden (“Housing Authority”) 1  alleging that her due process rights were violated when 
the Housing Authority terminated her Section 8
2
 housing.  She claims that the Housing 
Authority deprived her of her property without first informing her of the evidence it 
considered when making the decision to terminate her assistance. 
To keep her housing assistance, Baldwin was required to recertify her eligibility 
annually, which included submitting information about her income and family 
composition.  She did not attend a scheduled recertification meeting on April 2, 2009, 
because, she alleges, a granddaughter in her care was ill.  She asserts that when she 
contacted the case worker to reschedule the meeting and hand over the required 
documents, the case worker refused to accept them.  She further alleges that she attended 
a rescheduled appointment with Tracie Herrick, Assistant Director of Public Housing, 
and that Herrick also refused to accept her documents.  Baldwin also alleges that Herrick 
stated that “the case worker had failed to do her job correctly.”  In May 2009, she 
received a letter from Herrick informing her that her assistance would be terminated as of 
June 30, 2009 for failure to comply with the annual recertification requirements.  
                                                 
1
 Baldwin’s brief before the District Court included as a defendant Tracie Herrick, 
Director of Public Housing.  Baldwin has not included Herrick on her brief to this 
Court, and the case docket reflects the Housing Authority as the only defendant. 
 
2
 Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. 
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Baldwin appealed; after a hearing, the Housing Authority’s decision was upheld.  
Baldwin then filed her complaint in the District Court. 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  Baldwin’s motion 
reiterated the allegations in her complaint.  The Housing Authority’s motion refuted all of 
Baldwin’s allegations.3  It denied that the meeting was rescheduled, and pointed out that 
Baldwin gave no indication about when it was rescheduled.  The Housing Authority also 
refuted Baldwin’s claim that Herrick made any statement regarding a case manager’s job 
performance.  Finally, the Housing Authority noted that the May 2009 letter does explain 
the reasons for the recertification denial and that Baldwin’s own allegations demonstrate 
that the alleged denial of her appeal specifically referenced her failure to comply with the 
recertification requirements.   
The District Court found that no reasonable factfinder could find that the letters 
failed to identify the evidence upon which the Housing Authority’s decision was based, 
and granted summary judgment in favor of the Housing Authority.  Baldwin filed a 
timely appeal. 
 In reviewing a District Court’s grant of summary judgment, we exercise plenary 
review and apply the same standard that the District Court should have applied.  Regents 
                                                 
3
 The Housing Authority noted that Baldwin’s claims about her granddaughter’s 
illness were unsubstantiated.  Baldwin submitted a note from a prescription pad, 
dated four months after the scheduled April 2009 meeting, stating only that the 
granddaughter suffered from reflux and that she no longer takes medication.  In 
addition, her other evidence—notes from a “resident contact log”—merely 
confirm that she failed to appear at the hearing with all adult members of her 
household, as required. 
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of Mercersburg Coll. v. Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all inferences in that party’s 
favor, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Saldana 
v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The party 
opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . 
. pleading,” but “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial.”  Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (internal citations omitted). 
 Baldwin claims that the Housing Authority violated her due process rights when it 
terminated her benefits and denied her appeal.  Due process in this context requires a 
decision maker to state the reasons for his or her decision and indicate the evidence he or 
she relied on.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).  Likewise, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) regulations governing housing 
assistance termination provide that “[t]he person who conducts the hearing must issue a 
written decision, stating briefly the reasons for that decision.”  24 C.F.R. § 982.555(3)(6).  
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the Housing Authority’s letters 
denying recertification and Baldwin’s appeal each identified the basis for the Housing 
Authority’s decision—namely, Baldwin’s failure to comply with the recertification 
process.  Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Housing Authority. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
